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DO ABSTRACT IDEAS HAVE THE NEED, 
THE NEED FOR SPEED?:  AN EXAMINATION 
OF ABSTRACT IDEAS AFTER ALICE 
Maria R. Sinatra* 
 
Imagine you invented a way to perform mathematical calculations all 
over the world simultaneously.  Now, imagine that you cannot patent your 
invention because it was compared to, and found to contain, the same idea 
as an abacus.1  This scenario was the outcome of Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank 
International.2 
In coming to its decision in Alice, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a 
two-part test that it had previously utilized to analyze the patentability of 
laws of nature to determine whether the patent at issue met the subject 
matter patentability standards of § 101 of the Patent Act.  Determining the 
claim contained an abstract idea, the Court then addressed whether the 
invention was a patentable application and found it was not because 
“generic” computer implementation did not add “significantly more” to the 
underlying idea. 
Since Alice, courts have invalidated a number of patents for failing to 
meet this criteria—arguably turning from the plain meaning of the Patent 
Act and congressional intent.  Utilizing the Alice framework, courts have 
dismissed patent infringement claims in the pleading stages upon labeling 
them as abstract and citing reasoning as well as utilizing terminology that 
is more indicative of a § 102 or § 103 Patent Act analysis.  While an 
argument can be made that proactively dismissing some claims in the 
pleading stages could reduce the prevalence of patent trolls and improve 
the efficiency of the patent process, this Note argues that the widespread 
proclivity of courts to invalidate patents under § 101 by utilizing language 
indicative of § 102 and § 103 analysis robs patent holders of the ability to 
have their claims analyzed under proper standards and injects subjective 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2016, Fordham University School of Law; B.S., Business Administration, 
2013, Boston University.  I would like to thank my mother, father, grandparents, Vin, and 
Sam for their constant love and support. 
 
 1. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 
2347 (2014) (No. 13–298) (comparing the invention at hand to an abacus being operated by 
one of King Tut’s workers).  An abacus was a precursor to the modern calculator and 
computer and has been used since Babylonian times. See Abacus, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.britannica.com/technology/abacus-calculating-device 
[http://perma.cc/VV7Z-S5DH]. 
 2. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
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and uncertain criteria into the patent infringement analysis that could be 
avoided by implementing other analytical methods. 
As a remedy to the inclusion of § 102 and § 103 factors in the subject 
matter patentability analysis, this Note advocates that a substantial 
increase in speed or efficiency generated by an invention should be taken 
into account in determining if the invention adds “significantly more” to 
the idea.  This would create a tangible bright-line test that would allow the 
claim to move forward and be analyzed under more suitable Patent Act 
sections. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The rise of the information age has challenged scholars and the judiciary 
to determine whether an invention merely contains an unpatentable abstract 
idea or whether it contains patentable subject matter.3  In an effort to clarify 
its doctrine regarding abstract ideas and the judicial exceptions to 
patentability, the Supreme Court recently stated in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank 
International4 that for a patent claim containing an application of an 
abstract idea to contain patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the 
claim must add “significantly more” to the abstract idea than has previously 
been possible in the relevant industry.5 
The Alice standard has thus far led to the dismissal of many patents that 
were previously granted6—some in the pleadings stage7—by utilizing 
 
 3. See infra Part I.C. 
 4. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (analyzing the patentability of a computerized trading 
platform for eliminating risk). 
 5. See infra Part I.C–D. 
 6. See infra Part I.E. 
 7. See infra notes 202–04 and accompanying text. 
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language traditionally indicative of analysis under other sections of the 
Patent Act.  Some view the dismissal of claims before discovery as within 
the bounds of § 101 as a threshold inquiry and as beneficial for patent law, 
citing improvements in judicial efficiency, protection against patent trolls, 
and possible benefits for innovation.8  However, others argue that use of the 
Alice framework to dispose of these claims in the pleading stages has 
interjected 35 U.S.C. § 102 and § 103 criteria into the subject matter 
analysis—contrary to congressional intent.9  Effectively, this view holds 
that it robs the patent holder of the benefit of the clear and convincing 
evidence generated by discovery and, in its place, subjects the patent holder 
to analysis based largely on judicial impressions of whether the application 
of the idea meets the “significantly more” standard.10 
This Note analyzes whether the Alice framework blurs the line between 
the sections of the Patent Act when it requires courts and the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to determine what “significantly 
more” entails in the computer age.  Part I of this Note provides background 
information regarding patent law and the information age, the keystone 
cases that have shaped the Supreme Court’s current abstract idea doctrine, 
the ambiguity regarding what “significantly more” entails, and the effects 
Alice has had on lower courts and the USPTO.11  Next, Part II outlines the 
conflicting views regarding whether the Alice framework incorrectly blurs 
the line between subject matter patentability analysis and the other sections 
of the Patent Act, or whether the Alice framework works within the bounds 
of § 101 as a threshold inquiry and has positively affected patent law by 
allowing for the efficient dismissal of frivolous and abusive patent 
litigation.12 
Lastly, Part III argues that the Alice framework has negatively affected 
patent law by including § 102 and § 103 requirements in the § 101 analysis, 
because it imports criteria into the § 101 analysis that is traditionally 
reserved for other sections of the Patent Act, it creates unnecessary 
uncertainty, and it allows courts to usurp legislative decision making.  It 
then advocates for including a significant increase in speed or efficiency 
generated by the claim in the patentability analysis under § 101 for four 
reasons:  (1) it would allow § 101 to conform to its traditional “coarse 
filter” role in determining whether a claim deserves patent protection, 
restoring the balance between the “wide scope” traditionally given to the 
statutory text of § 101 and the judicial exceptions to patentability;13 (2) it 
would allow for greater certainty in the subject matter patentability 
analysis;14 (3) it would encourage innovation by providing incentive to 
 
 8. See infra Part II.B. 
 9. See infra Part II.A. 
 10. See infra Part II.A. 
 11. See infra Part I. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
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investors and inventors;15 and (4) it would diminish the judiciary’s role as a 
policymaker.16 
I.  PATENTS IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of patentable subject matter and 
the rise of the information age.  Part I.A discusses patents generally, while 
Part I.B discusses § 101 of the Patent Act.  Next, Part I.C discusses the 
judicial exceptions to patentability, as well as the keystone cases that have 
shaped the Supreme Court’s analysis of abstract ideas in the information 
age.  Part I.D then explains what the “significantly more” requirement 
entails to transform an abstract idea into a patentable application.  Lastly, 
Part I.E describes the effects of Alice on courts and the USPTO regarding 
patent invalidation under § 101. 
A.  Patents:  Who, What, When, Why, and How 
The first patent in the United States was issued in 1790 to Samuel 
Hopkins for making “potash,” a fertilizer ingredient.17  Since 1790, the 
USPTO has issued more than six million patents.18  A patent is a property 
right granted pursuant to the U.S. Constitution19 to an inventor “to exclude 
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention in the 
United States or importing the invention into the United States” for a 
limited time in exchange for disclosure of how the invention works.20 
To obtain a patent, the invention or discovery must be filed in an 
application to the USPTO, which then examines the application to 
determine if the invention or discovery fits the criteria of Title 35 of the 
 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, First U.S. Patent Issued Today 
in 1790 (July 31, 2001), http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2001/01-33.jsp [http://perma.cc/ 
R25Z-9SMH]. 
 18. See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Web Database Now 
Includes All Patents Dating from 1790 (Nov. 6, 2000), http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2000/ 
00-68.jsp [http://perma.cc/SDK7-RHDD]. 
 19. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power to . . . promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).  Little commentary on 
the thoughts of the Framers regarding the Constitution’s intellectual property clause exists 
other than the text itself, see Edward C. Walterscheid, Inherent or Created Rights:  Early 
Views on the Intellectual Property Clause, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 92 (1996), but some 
evidence of the importance the Framers placed upon protecting author’s and inventor’s rights 
can be found in the Federalist Papers, with James Madison stating that “[t]he utility of 
[patent protection] will scarcely be questioned.” THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 307 (James 
Madison) (Cynthia Brantley Johnson ed., 2004). 
 20. See General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE 
(Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-
concerning-patents (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012)) [http://perma.cc/DWU3-VUVN].  Patent 
protection for utility and plant patents is up to twenty years from the date the patent was 
granted, and patent protection for design patents is up to fourteen years from the date the 
patent was granted. See Id. 
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U.S. Code.21  If the invention meets the criteria detailed in the code, the 
USPTO grants the patent upon payment of a fee.22 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent can be granted to “[w]hoever invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”23  
However, if an invention or discovery falls into one of the subject matters 
expressed in § 101, it must also meet the novelty condition,24 meet the 
nonobvious condition,25 and be particularly described26 in order to receive 
patent protection.27 
In addition, four express categories of patentable subject matter are stated 
in § 101:  “processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of 
matter.”28  One of the most debated of these categories—and of the most 
importance to this Note—is process.29  A “process” does not have to be tied 
to a particular machine,30 and it is defined under § 101 as a “process, art or 
method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, 
composition of matter, or material.”31  The term “method” within the 
definition of “process” also “may include at least some methods of doing 
business” based on the plain meaning of the dictionary term of “method” 
and does not need to be tied to a particular machine in order to contain 
patentable subject matter.32 
B.  Interpreting § 101 
As a result of the conditional requirements of Title 35, courts have 
viewed the patentable subject matter requirement of § 101 as a “coarse 
 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id. 
 23. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 24. Id. § 102.  For a claimed invention to meet the “novelty” condition, it must not be 
“patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available 
to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention,” or it must not be 
“described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or 
deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application” belongs to 
another inventor. See id. § 102(a)(1)–(2). 
 25. Id. § 103.  For a claimed invention to be “nonobvious” as a whole, it must not be 
“obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention 
pertains.” See id. 
 26. See id. § 112.  In order to meet the specification conditions of § 112, the patent 
application must contain a “written description of the invention, and of the manner and 
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same.” Id. § 112(a). 
 27. Id. § 101 (stating that in order to receive patent protection, the invention or discovery 
must meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101, as well as “the conditions and requirements 
of [the whole] title”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609 (2010) (listing novelty, 
nonobviousness, and particular description as requirements for patent protection in addition 
to meeting the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101). 
 28. See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 601. 
 29. See generally Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 
(2012); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). See also Bilski, 561 U.S. at 603–04. 
 30. See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 603–04; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972). 
 31. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b); see also Bilski, 561 U.S. at 602. 
 32. See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 607. 
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filter.”33  Even if a patent contains subject matter sufficient to meet the 
requirement of § 101, it still may fail to be granted patent protection.34  
Determining whether a claim contains patentable subject matter is a “pure 
question of law,”35 and the effects of this analysis on abstract ideas will be 
discussed further in Part II.B of this Note.36 
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,37 the Supreme Court analyzed the text of 
§ 101 under the plain meaning of the statute38 and determined that Congress 
contemplated that § 101 would be given a “wide scope” by including the 
word “any.”39  Using this statutory interpretation, courts have found that 
they “should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which 
the legislature has not expressed.”40 
In addition to the plain meaning of the statute, courts have found that the 
legislative history indicates that patent laws should be given “broad 
construction.”41  Since the first patent legislation was drafted in 1793, the 
language of that legislation and all subsequent patent statutes have 
contained the word “any”42—embodying the view that “ingenuity should 
receive . . . liberal encouragement.”43  Even after Congress recodified the 
patent laws in 1952 (“the 1952 Act”), the language including “any” in the 
previous statutes remained intact.44  Committee reports surrounding the 
1952 Act, as well as commentary from the principal draftsman of the 1952 
recodification,45 indicate that Congress intended patentable subject matter 
under § 101 to “include anything under the sun that is made by man.”46 
In describing patentable subject matter under § 101, P.J. Federico, one of 
the principle draftsmen of the legislation, stated that a patent can be found 
eligible under the Act even if the patent utilizes a “new use of a known 
machine, manufacture, composition of matter or material” if it can also 
 
 33. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308–09 (1980) (describing an analysis 
of the statutory construction of 35 U.S.C. § 101 to determine that subject matter patentability 
should be given a wide scope); see also Bilski, 561 U.S. at 602 (describing § 101 as “only a 
threshold test”); Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (describing similar filter requirements). 
 34. See Research Corp. Techs., 627 F.3d at 868–69 (citing Bilski, 561 U.S. at 602). 
 35. Kickstarter, Inc. v. Fan Funded, LLC, No. 1:11-cv-06909-KPF, 2015 WL 3947178, 
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2015) (citing Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 
1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2012)), appeal docketed, No. 15–1886 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 36. See infra Part II.B. 
 37. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 38. See id. at 308–09. 
 39. See id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent.” (emphasis added)). 
 40. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 (quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 
289 U.S. 178 (1933)); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981). 
 41. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308–09; see also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182. 
 42. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308. 
 43. Id. (quoting 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75–76 (Washington ed. 1871)); see 
also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010). 
 44. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. 
 45. See Patent Law Codification and Revision:  Hearing on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm. 
No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 37 (1951) (statement of P.J. Federico). 
 46. See S. REP. NO. 89-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952). 
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satisfy the other conditions under Title 35.47  Consequently, courts have 
found a broad reading of 35 U.S.C. § 101 is necessary because the 
inventions most beneficial to mankind are often those that push the 
boundaries of science and are often unanticipated in the drafting of patent 
laws.48 
C.  Judicial Exceptions to Patentability Under § 101 
and the Rise of the Information Age 
Although Congress has expressed specific categories of subject matter 
that can be patented under § 101,49 courts have created judicial exceptions 
excluding “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” from 
patent protection.50  These judicial exceptions have existed for over a 
hundred years51 to prevent “tying up”52 natural laws and inhibiting future 
discoveries that might apply those basic principles.53 
Although the Court tends to use the terms “law of nature” and “natural 
phenomena” interchangeably,54 whether a claim contains an abstract idea is 
somewhat separate, and arguably harder to ascertain,55 especially after the 
rise of the computer and internet.56  Patents in the Industrial Age57 were 
 
 47. P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 161, 177 (1993). 
 48. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 316; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 181–83 
(1981). 
 49. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (providing “any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof” can be 
patentable subject matter). 
 50. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185; see also Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 
2352 (2014) (finding a claim contained an abstract idea unpatentable under § 101); Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012) (finding a claim 
containing a law of nature unpatentable under § 101).  Although these categories are usually 
depicted as the only judicial exceptions, other categories have also been described as 
exceptions to patentability. See The Hon. Paul R. Michel, The Supreme Court Saps Patent 
Certainty, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1751, 1757–58 (2014) (listing laws of nature, natural 
phenomenon, products of nature, natural correlations, and abstract ideas as terminology 
courts have used to describe exceptions). 
 51. See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–20 (1853); Le Roy v. 
Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174–75 (1852). 
 52. See Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1292. 
 53. See id. at 1293 (“[M]onopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent might 
tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”); Mackay Radio & Tel. 
Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939). 
 54. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948) (utilizing 
the term “natural principle”); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1296.  The 
Court has also described a law of nature as a “scientific truth.” See id. at 1293–94.  Common 
examples of scientific truths are Albert Einstein’s famous formula E=mc2, which is used to 
describe mass-energy equivalence, and Isaac Newton’s discovery of the law of gravity. See 
id. at 1293. 
 55. See Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1316 (2011). 
 56. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 605 (2010) (discussing the differences in patent 
analysis between the information age and the Industrial Age). 
 57. The Industrial Age is typically used to denote the period between the 18th century 
and 19th century in English and American history during which the Industrial Revolution 
occurred. See GEORGE SOULE, ECONOMIC FORCES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 150–51 (1952).  
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rarely granted without ties to a machine or apparatus,58 and courts have 
argued that there is no evidence that “processes for organizing human 
activity were or ever had been patentable.”59  Justice Stevens has even 
claimed, “Prior to 1968, well-established principles of patent law probably 
would have prevented the issuance of a valid patent on almost any 
conceivable computer program.”60 
Even when a patent claim was tied to a machine or apparatus, the Court 
has invalidated claims when it was not “particularly described.”61  For 
example, in O’Reilly v. Morse,62 a patent for improving upon the telegraph 
was invalidated because it was not limited in scope and, as a result, it would 
have foreclosed others from using the basic ideas present in the telegraph 
technology63—namely utilizing “electric or galvanic current” in telegraph 
operation.64 
Since the 1970s however, the computer industry has experienced “rapid 
growth” and has changed our daily lives.65  From 1995 to 2005, the number 
of internet users tripled from roughly 513 million to nearly 1.7 billion,66 
and, currently, the estimated number of users is closer to three billion—
approximately 40 percent of the world’s population.67  People now bank,68 
obtain academic degrees,69 shop,70 and complete numerous other tasks 
online that were never thought possible before the rise of computers, 
software, and the internet.71  Scholars have dubbed this boom in 
 
The Industrial Revolution was marked by a rapid increase in manufacturing, mass 
production, and special purpose machinery. See id. at 138. 
 58. See Bilski, 561 U.S. 593, 605 (2010) (citing In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 966–76 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (Dyk, J., concurring)), aff’d on other grounds, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 59. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 972 (Dyk, J., concurring), aff’d on other grounds, 561 U.S. 
593. 
 60. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 195 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also 
Bilski, 561 U.S. at 605. 
 61. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 120–21 (1853). 
 62. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853). 
 63. See id. at 118–19. 
 64. See id. at 113. 
 65. See David C. Tunick, Has the Computer Changed the Law?, 13 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 43, 43 (1994). 
 66. See Oliver Burkeman, Forty Years of the Internet:  How the World Changed for 
Ever, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2009, 3:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/ 
2009/oct/23/internet-40-history-arpanet [http://perma.cc/5ZKN-V278]. 
 67. See INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/ (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2015) (reporting that as of July 1, 2014 the estimated number of internet 
users throughout the world is 2,925,249,355 people out of the total world’s population of 
7,243,784,121 people) [http://perma.cc/4GQ3-WKCS]. 
 68. See, e.g., BANK OF AM. ONLINE, https://www.bankofamerica.com/onlinebanking/ 
online-banking.go (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [https://perma.cc/L7XS-8AH4]. 
 69. See, e.g., PHOENIX UNIVERSITY, http://www.phoenix.edu/colleges_divisions/ 
education.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/G4P9-X7B7]. 
 70. See, e.g., AMAZON ONLINE, http://www.amazon.com/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) 
[http://perma.cc/E9LE-UQLK]. 
 71. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 194 n.1 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(describing the technological era since the first general purpose electronic digital computer 
was built in 1946).  The utility of the internet has even been compared to that of the 
invention of the printing press. See JOHN NAUGHTON, FROM GUTENBERG TO ZUCKERBERG 24 
(2012). 
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technology, and the world’s subsequent transition from a goods-based 
economy to a knowledge-based economy, as the information age.72 
During the information age, the number of software patents issued has 
increased dramatically.73  Roughly 15 percent of the U.S. patents granted in 
2009 were for software inventions,74 and the market for software products 
in the United States is substantial.  Americans spend more money on 
software than gasoline and more than double on software than they spend 
on fast food.75  This expenditure is far larger than what early courts could 
anticipate76 and has led to an increase in multimillion-dollar disputes 
regarding software patents.77 
Despite making up a significant portion of patents granted today, the 
terms “software” and “computer” are not defined anywhere in Patent Act, 
and controversy surrounds the issue of whether software patents are “too 
abstract or too vague.”78  Although both dictionaries and the courts have 
attempted to define abstraction,79 part of the problem in interpreting patent 
law “is that no one understands what makes an idea ‘abstract.’”80 
The Supreme Court has held that inventions concerning computer 
software programs can contain patentable subject matter,81 but it recognizes 
that the information age “raises new difficulties for . . . patent law.”82  
 
 72. See, e.g., NAUGHTON, supra note 71, at 189 (stating that we now “live in a 
knowledge economy”); see also John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing 
Complexity of the United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 78 (2002); Note, 
Antitrust and the Information Age:  Section 2 Monopolization Analyses in the New Economy, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 1623, 1627–28 (2001). 
 73. See ROBERT PLOTKIN, THE GENIE IN THE MACHINE:  HOW COMPUTER-AUTOMATED 
INVENTING IS REVOLUTIONIZING LAW AND BUSINESS 8–9 (2009). 
 74. See id.  From 1998 to 2011 over 320,799 patents were issued in the technology era. 
See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1313 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) 
(Moore, J., dissenting). 
 75. See GREGORY A. STOBBS, United States of America, in SOFTWARE PATENTS 
WORLDWIDE 9 (2014) (describing expenditures of Americans on software at $383.3 billion, 
fast food at $100 billion, and gasoline at $324 billion in 2005). 
 76. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 587 n.7 (1978) (describing the value of computer 
programs as $43.1 billion in 1976 and estimated to climb to $70.7 billion in 1980). 
 77. See BEN KLEMENS, MA+H YOU CAN’T USE:  PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, AND SOFTWARE 6 
(2006).  Ben Klemens posits that the nature of the software writing process being 
discoverable by independent inventors has in some ways fueled the increase in litigation 
surrounding software patents. See id. 
 78. PLOTKIN, supra note 73, at 124; see also W. Wayt King, Jr., The Soul of the Virtual 
Machine:  In re Alappat, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 575, 576–77 (1995). 
 79. See Abstract, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) 
(defining abstract as “expressing a quality apart from an object”); see also In re Alappat, 33 
F.3d 1526, 1542 n.18 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (defining abstract ideas as “disembodied concepts or 
truths which are not ‘useful’ from a practical standpoint standing alone, i.e. they are not 
‘useful’ until reduced to some practical application”); PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, LEGAL 
ANALYSIS TO SUPPORT PROPOSED EXAMINATION GUIDELINES FOR COMPUTER-IMPLEMENTED 
INVENTIONS 14 (1995), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/hearings/software/analysis/ 
softlaw.pdf (describing an abstract idea as “any sequence of mathematical operations that are 
combined to solve a mathematical problem”) [http://perma.cc/N3DA-AWTC]. 
 80. See Lemley et al., supra note 55, at 1316. 
 81. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 605 (2010) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 
175, 192–93 (1981)). 
 82. Id. at 606. 
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These difficulties are unique.83  From the time the patent statutes were 
enacted through the Industrial Revolution, U.S. patent law has been able to 
handle the introduction of revolutionary technology “without so much as a 
hiccup.”84  Part of the reason scholars believe software is so difficult to 
analyze under patent law is that its “ephemeral quality” does not fit 
comfortably into the traditional notion of tools and “useful arts.”85  
Software “has no physical manifestation beyond symbols on paper or bits 
on a hard drive,”86 and there is no difference between software and 
mathematics.87  Consequently, courts have had difficulty in determining 
whether software ideas are patentable, as “pure mathematics cannot be 
patented” under the judicial exceptions to patentability.88 
The Supreme Court started to clarify its subject matter patentability 
analysis in the information age in Gottschalk v. Benson,89 when it struck 
down a patent application claiming a method for “converting binary coded 
decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals.”90  In the Court’s view, 
the patent claim fell within a judicial exception to § 10191—an attempt to 
patent the formula for the algorithm for binary code.92  While it did not 
uphold the patent, the Court was cognizant that it must not hinder the 
invention of new technology,93 and it viewed the legislature as the proper 
vehicle to make a determination as to whether patents of this sort should be 
issued.94 
Following Benson, the Court further expanded its analysis of patentable 
subject matter in Parker v. Flook95 when it held that a patent attempting to 
claim a “[m]ethod for [u]pdating [a]larm [l]imits” was invalid under 
§ 101.96  Applying Benson, the Court found the patent did nothing more 
than add a post-solution formula that was already known “within the prior 
art.”97  In its analysis, the Court stated that the algorithm within the patent 
 
 83. See PLOTKIN, supra note 73, at 124. 
 84. Id. (describing how patent law has been flexible enough to accommodate the internal 
combustion engine and the light bulb without significant changes); King, Jr., supra note 78, 
at 575–76. 
 85. See King, Jr., supra note 78, at 576; see also KLEMENS, supra note 77, at 44; 
PLOTKIN, supra note 73, at 126 (describing software as “abstract and intangible” and 
traditional patent material as “concrete and tangible”). 
 86. See KLEMENS, supra note 77, at 44. 
 87. See id. at 26. 
 88. See id. at 44. Compare Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981) (holding a 
software patent application contained patentable subject matter under § 101), with Parker v. 
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (holding a patent containing software was invalid because it 
fell within the judicial exception to § 101 for abstract ideas). 
 89. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 90. Id. at 64. 
 91. See id. at 71–72. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. at 71–73. 
 94. See id. 
 95. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 96. See id. at 585, 595 n.18 (“[A] claim for an improved method of calculation, even 
when tied to a specific end use, [was] unpatentable subject matter under § 101.”). 
 97. See id. at 594. 
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claim “is treated as though it were a familiar part of the prior art.”98  As 
such, the Court separated the part of the patent that included the abstract 
idea from the rest of the claimed invention, but attempted to state that it still 
was analyzing the claim as a whole.99 
Even so, “proceed[ing] cautiously,”100 the Court did not foreclose all 
patents involving computer programming,101 stating that computer 
programs, which were “novel and useful,” might be deserving of patent 
protection under § 101.102 
However, shortly after deciding Flook, the Court again revisited subject 
matter patentability in Diamond v. Diehr,103 analyzing whether a patent 
application for a process molding raw rubber into cured precision products 
contained patentable subject matter.104  The patent application claimed a 
process that utilized a computer to implement the Arrhenius equation in 
order to create “uniformly accurate cures,” which was well known at the 
time in the industry for curing rubber.105  However, the Court found that 
“processes” have always been patentable subject matter under § 101, and 
“[i]f new and useful, [they are] just as patentable as is a piece of 
machinery.”106 
The Court then turned to whether the use of the equation caused the 
patent application to fall under the judicial exception to § 101 for 
mathematical formulas.107  Holding that because the patent application did 
not seek to claim a mathematical formula, but instead a “process of curing 
synthetic rubber,” it was patentable subject matter because it did not fall 
under the judicial exception to the statute.108 
While the equation was not patentable in “isolation,” it was not barred 
from patentability under § 101 because the “process . . . for curing 
rubber . . . incorporate[d] in it a more efficient solution of the 
equation . . . .”109  The Court stressed that novelty should not be taken into 
account while analyzing a claim under § 101 because it is “wholly apart 
from whether the invention falls into a category of statutory subject 
matter.”110 
 
 98. See id. at 592. 
 99. See id. at 591–92; see also John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says 
Another:  A Need for Housecleaning in the Law of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1765, 1781 (2014). 
 100. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 596. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. at 595. 
 103. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 104. See generally id. 
 105. See id. at 176–78. 
 106. See id. at 182–83 (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1877)). 
 107. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187–88. 
 108. See id. at 188. 
 109. See id. at 188–92 (emphasis added) (describing how the invention must implement 
or apply a formula in a way which, “when considered as a whole, is performing a function 
which the patent laws were designed to protect”). 
 110. See id. at 190 (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1979)) (citing 
legislative history indicating that § 101 describes patentable subject matter and § 102 
“covers the conditions relating to novelty”). 
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While the patent application met this requirement in Diehr, the Court 
emphasized that this did not mean it would be eligible for patent protection 
without satisfying the other requirements of the Patent Act.111 
In some ways, it appears that the Court decisions in Diehr and Flook do 
not align,112 although the Court did not overturn its prior decision113 and the 
makeup of the Court did not change.114  Scholars are still debating and 
analyzing the impacts of these opinions.115 
Following the three above cases, the Court did not revisit the question of 
subject matter patentability until its decision in Bilski v. Kappos116 roughly 
twenty years later.  In Bilski, the Court invalidated the patent, which 
claimed a method for hedging risk that could be implemented by 
commodities traders in the energy market, but stated that patents concerning 
business methods could still contain patentable subject matter.117 
Holding that the “machine or transformation” test was not the sole 
indicator of whether a patent claimed an abstract idea, natural phenomenon, 
or law of nature,118 the Court still viewed the test as a “useful and important 
clue, an investigative tool” for determining whether process inventions 
meet the § 101 threshold.119 
After analyzing the plain meaning of the text and legislative history of 
the statute, the Court stressed the “wide scope” that should be granted to 
§ 101.120  In turn, the Court concluded that patents claiming business 
methods could receive patent protection if they did not fall into a judicial 
exception and complied with the other conditions of Title 35.121 
 
 111. See id. at 191 (describing how the invention must still be novel under § 102 and 
nonobvious under § 103 in order to receive patent protection). 
 112. See Golden, supra note 99, at 1781–82 (discussing the inconsistencies between the 
two opinions); see also Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Inventive Application:  A History, 67 FLA. L. REV. 
565, 573–76 (2015); Michel, supra note 50, at 1755–56 (discussing the inconsistencies of 
Flook and Diehr). 
 113. Flook and Diehr have not been explicitly overturned. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank 
Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355–56 (2014) (citing both Flook and Diehr). 
 114. The composition of the Supreme Court during both the Diehr and Flook decisions 
were the same. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (with Justices Blackmun, Brennan, 
White, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens comprising the majority opinion of the Court and 
Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger in dissent); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 
U.S. 175 (1981) (with Justices Rehnquist, White, Powell, Stewart, and Chief Justice Burger 
comprising the majority opinion and Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens in 
dissent). 
 115. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 116. 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 117. See id. at 606–07 (“Section 101 . . . precludes the broad contention that the term 
‘process’ categorically excludes business methods.”). 
 118. See id. at 603–04.  The “machine-or-transformation” test states that for a process to 
contain patentable subject matter, it must (1) be “tied to a particular machine or apparatus,” 
or (2) transform “a particular article into a different state or thing.” See id. at 602 (quoting In 
re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 119. See id. at 604.  Justice Stevens called the machine-or-transformation test a “critical 
clue.” Id. at 614 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 120. See id. at 601 (majority opinion) (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 
(1980)). 
 121. See id. at 601–02. 
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However, in a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens criticized the plurality 
opinion stating that it did not “provide[] a satisfying account of what 
constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea”122 and indicated that the plurality 
may have blurred the line between the specificity requirement of § 112 and 
what actually is patentable subject matter under § 101.123 
Following Bilski, the analysis of abstract ideas under § 101 has been 
greatly influenced by Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc.,124 although the claim at issue did not involve an abstract 
idea.125  In Mayo, the Court struck down a patent claiming a process for 
using thiopurine drugs to treat autoimmune diseases—specifically, for a 
more precise way to calculate patients’ drug dosage126—because it found 
that the claim did not add “enough” to the underlying natural law in order 
for it to constitute patentable subject matter.127 
To transform a law of nature into a patentable application, the Court 
stated that the claimed patent must do more than state the law of nature and 
say “apply it”—it must contain an “‘inventive concept’, sufficient to ensure 
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon 
the natural law itself.”128 
However, the Court did not explicitly define what would constitute 
“significantly more” in order to make an application of a natural law 
patentable.  A clue that the Court provided to determine if a claim added 
“significantly more” was that the patent at issue should not state “well-
understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged” in by people 
in the field of the claimed invention.129  But what makes industry practices 
routine and conventional is debatable.130  In its analysis, the Court again 
noted the danger in interpreting the judicial exceptions to patentability too 
broadly, as doing so could be detrimental to patent law because “all 
inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”131 
Most recently, the Supreme Court analyzed the subject matter 
patentability of abstract ideas in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 
 
 122. Id. at 621 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 123. See id. at 620–21. 
 124. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); see also Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 
2356–57 (2014) (adopting the two-part test for analyzing laws of nature in Mayo to the 
analysis of the patentability of abstract ideas). 
 125. See Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1293–95 (analyzing a law of nature). 
 126. See id. at 1294–95. 
 127. See id. at 1297. 
 128. See id. at 1294. 
 129. See id. at 1299. 
 130. Compare Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981) (finding a patentable 
application of an abstract idea when a computer was added), with Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank 
Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014) (finding the patent at issue contained unpatentable subject 
matter by just adding “generic computer implementations”). 
 131. See Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1293–94 (cautioning application of the 
judicial exception too broadly could “eviscerate patent law”); Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2357 
(quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs., 123 S. Ct. at 1293); Federico, supra note 47, at 177 (“In 
one sense every invention is nothing but the result of new uses of old materials.”). 
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which centered around a “computerized trading platform for exchanging 
obligations in which a trusted third party settles obligations between a first 
and second party so as to eliminate ‘settlement risk.’”132 
Initially, the Federal Circuit held that the claim was a patent-eligible 
application of an abstract idea.133  However, it issued an opinion vacating 
its decision and granting an en banc hearing shortly afterward.134  Although 
the en banc panel was highly fractured,135 the plurality opinion by Judge 
Lourie analyzed the claim in light of the Supreme Court’s precedents in 
Flook, Diehr, Bilski, and Mayo to come to the conclusion that the claim at 
issue did not amount to “more than ‘well-understood, routine, conventional 
activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field.’”136 
The Supreme Court then affirmed the en banc decision137 and adopted 
the two-part framework to examine abstract ideas that it previously used to 
examine laws of nature in Mayo.138  First, the Court determined that the 
patents were directed to an abstract idea139—“intermediated settlement.”140  
Then, it determined that the claims did not transform the abstract idea by 
adding substantially more to it141 because it simply took the abstract idea of 
settlement risk and implemented it using “wholly generic computer 
implementation.”142  The Court came to its decision without defining what 
“abstract” means.143  Instead, it simply compared the claims at issue to the 
abstract idea in Bilski.144 
 
 132. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 685 F.3d 1341, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012), vacated, 484 
Fed. App’x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 133. See id. at 1343. 
 134. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1269–70 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en 
banc), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 135. Judges Lourie, Dyk, Prost, Reyna, and Wallach concurred in the plurality opinion; 
Judges Rader, Linn, Moore, and O’Mally concurred in part and dissented in part; Judges 
Moore, Rader, Linn, and O’Malley dissented in part; Judge Newman filed an opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part; and Judges Linn and O’Malley dissented from the 
court’s judgment. See id. at 1270.  Commentators viewed the fractured nature of the opinion 
as “add[ing] to the uncertainty” surrounding the patentability of computer inventions. See 
Erika H. Arner & Lauren J. Dreyer, CLS Bank v. Alice Leads to an Even Murkier Morass, 
230 MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 44, 44 (2013). 
 136. See Alice Corp., 717 F.3d at 1283 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. 
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012)). 
 137. See Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2352. 
 138. See id. at 2355–57. 
 139. See id. at 2355. 
 140. See id. at 2352. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See id. at 2358. 
 143. Erik Paul Belt, Alice Doesn’t Live Here Anymore:  A Critique of the Supreme 
Court’s “Abstract Ideas” Test, 45 BPLA NEWSLETTER 3 (Winter 2015), http://www.bpla. 
org/?NewsL20150102Alice [http://perma.cc/8ELG-JDUY].  Some scholars, such as former 
Chief Judge Paul R. Michel, view that this use of “abstractness” to determine § 101 
patentability has proved to be “entirely unworkable” due to the “vague and subjective” 
nature of the term. See Brief of the Honorable Paul R. Michel as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Neither Party at 7, Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. 2347 (No. 13–298) [hereinafter Michel Brief] 
(describing how abstractness in patent law has led to “unpredictable results in the hands of 
7,000 examiners and some 1,000 district judges, not to mention the countless thousands of 
patent attorneys, inventors, business leaders, and investors”). 
 144. See Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2358–59. 
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D.  What “Significantly More” Entails 
In Alice, the Court stated that “wholly generic computer implementation” 
did not add substantially more to the underlying idea145 and indicated that 
“generic computer implementation[s]” would likely be those that only 
improved efficiency146—although it did not actually explicitly define what 
“wholly generic” consisted of with regard to computer software.147 
Some members of the Federal Circuit shared Alice’s view of 
“significantly more,” stating that “[u]nless the claims require a computer to 
perform operations that are not merely accelerated calculations, a computer 
does not itself confer patent eligibility.”148  The reason Judge Lourie cited 
for this determination was that a “computer is just a calculator capable of 
performing mental steps faster than a human could.”149 
He is not alone in this assertion.150  Another Federal Circuit judge, Judge 
Dyk, has held a similar position.  In SiRF Technology, Inc. v. International 
Trade Commission151—although the court ultimately determined that the 
patents at issue152 contained patentable subject matter153—Judge Dyk 
stated: 
In order for the addition of a machine to impose a meaningful limit on the 
scope of a claim, it must play a significant part in permitting the claimed 
method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious 
mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly, i.e., 
through the utilization of a computer for performing calculations.154 
In coming to this conclusion, he noted that although the claim at issue 
contained mathematical calculations, the scope of the claim was properly 
 
 145. See id. at 2358. 
 146. See id. at 2358–59. 
 147. See id.; John Kong, Practical Points from the Supreme Court’s Alice Decision, 
CAFC ALERT (June 19, 2014), http://cafc.whda.com/2014/06/practical-points-from-the-
supreme-courts-alice-decision/ (describing how the court did not define what a “generic” 
computer means) [http://perma.cc/WH8H-HFWG].  “Generic” is an adjective defined as 
“relating to or characteristic of a whole group or class” or “having no particularly distinctive 
quality or application.” See Generic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th 
ed. 2003). 
 148. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc), 
aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 n.18 (1978) (“[A] claim for an improved 
method of calculation, even when tied to a specific end use, is unpatentable subject matter 
under § 101.”); see also SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010). 
 151. 601 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 152. See id. at 1333.  Judge Dyk describes “Assisted-GPS” technology as a process where 
the navigation message from a satellite is “collected by a receiving station with an 
unobstructed view of the sky, and then transmitted to GPS receivers via computer servers” 
through a connection such as a wireless network. See id. at 1323. 
 153. See id. at 1333. 
 154. See id. (emphasis added). 
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limited because there was “no evidence [in that case] that the 
calculations . . . can be performed entirely in the human mind.”155 
However, this view of “significantly more” is not without criticism.  
Judge Rader,156 former Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, raised a 
proposition concerning whether speed can constitute a “meaningful 
limitation” with regard to patent eligibility under § 101.157  While agreeing 
with the prior Supreme Court precedent stating that a computer “does not 
render [the claim] abstract,”158 he disagreed with Judge Lourie’s opinion 
that “a computer must do something other than what a computer does 
before it may be considered a patent-eligible invention.”159  He posited, 
“[i]f a computer can do what a human can in a better, specifically limited 
way,” the invention can cover patentable subject matter160—venturing to 
say that “even an increase in speed alone may be sufficient to result in a 
meaningful limitation.”161 
Judge Rader provided an example:  “[I]f a computer can perform a 
process that would take a human an entire lifetime, a claim covering that 
solution should be sufficiently limited to be patent eligible.”162 
Prior courts have also held that specific increases in efficiency tied to 
computers constituted patentable subject matter under § 101.163  In Diehr, 
 
 155. See id.  Subsequent courts have also highlighted this limiting criteria. See, e.g., 
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(discussing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972), and describing that a calculation 
that can be executed entirely by the human mind or by using pen and paper contained 
unpatentable subject matter under § 101); see also Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life 
Assurance. Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[A] computer must be 
integral to the claimed invention, facilitating the process in a way that a person making 
calculations or computations could not.”); Belt, supra note 143 (discussing Tuxis Techs. v. 
Amazon.com, No. 13-1771-RGA, 2014 WL 4382446 (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2014), and how claim 
drafters should highlight the ability that makes a computer central to a claim, like 
“require[ing] 10,000 operations or transactions per second,” that are unable to be mentally 
calculated by a person). 
 156. Judge Randall Rader retired in 2014 after being on the Federal Circuit since 1990. 
See History of the Federal Judiciary:  Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, 1789–
Present, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (search “Rader”) (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/NBB7-KU73]. 
 157. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1306 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en 
banc) (Rader, J., concurring), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 158. See id. at 1306; see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 605 (2010) (describing how 
computer programs could be patentable); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (“[A] 
claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply 
because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital computer.”); Parker v. 
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978). 
 159. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d at 1306 n.7 (Rader, J., concurring). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. (emphasis added).  Judge Rader’s idea might also be consistent with that of 
Samuelson and Schultz, who explain that a clue for determining subject matter patentability 
is whether the invention has “specific benefits that are measurable.” Pamela Samuelson & 
Jason Schultz, “Clues” for Determining Whether Business and Service Innovations Are 
Unpatentable Abstract Ideas, in PERSPECTIVES ON PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 8, 13 
(Michael B. Abramowicz, James E. Daily & F. Scott Kieff eds., 2015). 
 162. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d at 1306 n.7. 
 163. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188; Research Corp. Techs., v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 
859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding a patent claim for rendering gray scale images patentable 
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the Supreme Court held that a patent that claimed “a more efficient solution 
of the equation” utilized for curing rubber contained patentable subject 
matter under § 101,164 and the decision has not been explicitly overruled.165  
Whether the “significantly more” requirement of Alice has been met is 
under further evaluation by lower courts and the USPTO.166 
E.  Alice:  The Invalidator of Patents 
Historically, once a patent was granted by the USPTO, it was presumed 
valid by the courts absent “clear and convincing evidence”167 to the 
contrary.168  Under § 282 of the Patent Act,169 when a patent’s validity is 
challenged, the burden rests with the challenging party,170 and the court 
must consider the patent’s validity in light of the whole invention or 
discovery.171 
However, since Alice, courts have been invalidating patents at a 
“legendary rate.”172  The majority of lower courts have invalidated patents 
under § 101 since June 2014, stating that the claims contain unpatentable 
abstract ideas.173  As of June 2015, federal courts have invalidated seventy-
 
under § 101 because “inventions with specific applications or improvements to technologies 
in the marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that they override the statutory language to 
the Patent Act”). 
 164. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (emphasis added). 
 165. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014); David Kappos, 
Symposium:  Supreme Court Leaves Patent Protection for Software Innovation Intact, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-supreme-
court-leaves-patent-protection-for-software-innovation-intact (discussing how “Diehr’s new 
and useful process for curing rubber was held to be innately patentable” in Alice) 
[http://perma.cc/AMT3-FLWS]. 
 166. See infra Part I.E. 
 167. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011). 
 168. See Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., 293 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1934). 
 169. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) (providing that invalidity can be a defense to a patent 
infringement claim and that “a patent shall be presumed valid”). 
 170. Id.; i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. at 2242. 
 171. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981) (stating that the “fact that by 
themselves one or more steps might not be novel or independently eligible for patent 
protection was irrelevant to the issue of whether the claims as a whole recited subject matter 
eligible for patent protection”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010). 
 172. Lewis Hudnell, The Wonderland of Patent Ineligibility As Litigation Defense, 
LAW360 (June 5, 2015, 10:19 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/662143/the-
wonderland-of-patent-ineligibility-as-litigation-defense [http://perma.cc/E29T-CCF2]; see 
also Robert R. Sachs, Twenty-Two Ways Congress Can Save Section 101, BLISKIBLOG.COM 
(Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2015/02/twenty-two-ways-congress-can-
save-section-101.html [http://perma.cc/ZZA3-BVVJ]. 
 173. See, e.g., Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 Fed. App’x 1005, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 
2014) (applying Alice and invalidating a patent for a computer-aided management of a game 
of bingo because it could be “carried out by a human using pen and paper”); buySAFE, Inc. 
v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (applying Alice and invalidating the 
patent); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. For Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1347 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014); DietGoal Innovations LLC v. Bravo Media LLC, 33 F. Supp. 3d 271, 290 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014); Comcast IP Holdings I, LLC v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 55 F. Supp. 3d 544, 
551 (D. Del. 2014); Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 3d 813 (E.D. 
Va. 2014). But see Card Verification Solutions, LLC v. Citigroup Inc., No. 13 C 6339, 2014 
WL 4922524, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2014) (holding that the claimed patent describing a 
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six out of 106 patent claims on § 101 grounds that have been analyzed 
under the Alice framework.174  Some of this invalidation has taken place at 
the motion to dismiss stage.175  Since Alice, more than 50 percent of 
motions to dismiss patent infringement claims have been granted.176  This 
has led to courts invalidating more patents under § 101 since Alice than they 
had in the previous five years combined177 and to more uncertainty in 
patent law—an effect that the judiciary has viewed negatively in the past.178 
Likewise, the Alice framework has also affected the process by which 
business method patents are evaluated by the USPTO.  In response to the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Alice, the USPTO released preliminary 
examination instructions with regard to examining patents involving 
abstract ideas—specifically, computer-implemented abstract ideas.179  
Patent examiners are to apply the Alice and Mayo framework to analyze all 
judicial exceptions to patentability—not just laws of nature as was the 
practice prior to Alice—as well as to all types of patent claims, whether the 
claims purport to be product or process claims.180 
First, patent examiners must analyze whether the claim covers an abstract 
idea (or other judicial exception).  If it does, then they must determine 
whether “any element, or combination of elements, in the claim is sufficient 
to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea 
itself.”181 
Following the issuance of its memorandum, the USPTO has since 
withdrawn notice of allowances for some patent applications that it deemed 
were most likely affected by Alice—applications claiming an abstract idea 
involving generic computer implementation.182  And, since the Alice 
 
means to verify “information for a transaction securely” contained an abstract idea, but 
added “elements” to it in order to constitute patentable subject matter under § 101). 
 174. See Robert R. Sachs, The One Year Anniversary:  The Aftermath of #Alicestorm, 
BILSKIBLOG.COM (June 20, 2015), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2015/06/the-one-year-
anniversary-the-aftermath-of-alicestorm.html [http://perma.cc/ASB3-9TB7]. 
 175. Belt, supra note 143 (discussing Tuxis Techs., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 13-
1771-RGA, 2014 WL 4382446 (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2014)); see also Sachs, supra note 174 
(detailing the number of patents that have been dismissed under § 101 at the motion to 
dismiss stage after Alice); Sachs, supra note 172. 
 176. See Sachs, supra note 172. 
 177. See generally id. 
 178. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 613 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing 
how keeping patent law “stable and clear” is of the utmost importance); In re Bilski, 545 
F.3d 943, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“Uncertainty is the enemy of 
innovation.”), aff’d on other grounds, 561 U.S. 593; see also Timothy B. Dyk, Ten 
Prescriptions for What Ails Patent Law, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 345, 350–51 (2014). 
 179. See Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Deputy Comm’r for Patent 
Examination Policy, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, to Patent Examining Corp (June 25, 
2014), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/announce/alice_pec_25jun2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
4F5H-NELB]. 
 180. See id. at 2. 
 181. See id. at 3. 
 182. See Peggy Focarino, Update on USPTO’s Implementation of “Alice v. CLS Bank”, 
DIRECTOR’S FORUM:  A BLOG FROM USPTO’S LEADERSHIP (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.uspto. 
gov/blog/director/entry/update_on_uspto_s_implementation [http://perma.cc/Q9CC-85XT].  
Since the USPTO has implemented Alice in patent examinations, over 800 patent 
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decision, the USPTO has received fewer filings claiming business 
methods.183  As a result, scholars have expressed that this signals a 
fundamental change in the “law and future of software patents.”184 
II.  THE CONFLICTING VIEWS ON WHETHER 
ALICE EXCEEDS ITS § 101 BOUNDS 
The test that the Supreme Court utilized for examining laws of nature in 
Mayo, and abstract ideas in Alice, is not without criticism and, alternatively, 
praise.185  Some individuals believe that the Alice framework has blurred 
the procedural boundaries and requirements of the Patent Act, while others 
believe that the Alice test conforms to the Patent Act’s framework of § 101 
as a threshold inquiry.  Part II of this Note discusses both viewpoints.  First, 
Part II.A describes the view that the Alice framework is unworkable 
because it injects into the subject matter patentability analysis criteria that is 
normally reserved for analysis under other sections of the Patent Act, 
creating uncertainty and, with it, potential to stifle innovation.  In contrast, 
Part II.B describes the view that the Alice framework for analyzing subject 
matter patentability conforms to the § 101 procedural framework as a 
threshold inquiry, allowing the courts and the USPTO to efficiently process 
patent claims and curb abusive patent litigation. 
A.  Alice Blurs the Lines 
Some individuals take the view that the Alice framework has produced a 
negative effect on patent law by blurring the § 101 criteria with the criteria 
 
applications have been withdrawn. See Tristan Gray-Le Coz & Charles Duan, Apply It to the 
USPTO:  Review of the Implementation of Alice v. CLS Bank in Patent Examination, 2014 
PATENTLY–O PATENT L.J. 1, 2.  Software companies appear to be the most affected by the 
Alice decision and “tens of thousands of assets owned by . . . IBM, Microsoft, Apple, Oracle, 
Google and Cisco could be threatened by” the Alice holding. See Joff Wild, Big US Tech 
Companies Face Major Patent Losses in the Post-Alice World, IAM Research Reveals, IAM 
MAGAZINE (Sept. 27, 2014), http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=2028 
b324-2d4a-4523-9f0d-f0773b8b3fa1 [http://perma.cc/B3DQ-C44X].  International Business 
Machines Corporation (IBM), eBay Inc., and Microsoft Corporation were the top three 
applicants with the most post-Alice withdrawals. See Gray-Le Coz & Duan, supra note 182, 
at 5. 
 183. See “Stat of the Quarter”—Monthly Filings in USPC Classes 435, 506, 530, 536, 
and 514 (Biologics and Diagnostic Methods) and USPC Class 705 (Business Methods), Not 
Including RCEs, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2015) (depicting less business method filings per month than occurred in the 
months prior to the Alice decision) [http://perma.cc/726F-M4S8]. 
 184. See Gene Quinn, The Ramifications of Alice:  A Conversation with Mark Lemley, 
IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/09/04/the-ramifications-of-
alice-a-conversation-with-mark-lemley/id=51023/ (depicting Quinn and Lemley agreeing 
that Alice’s impact on patent law is significant due to the change in the way that lower courts 
and the USPTO have analyzed patentability issues after Alice) [http://perma.cc/A7L2-
TUYB]; see also Timothy B. Lee, Software Patents Are Crumbling, Thanks to the Supreme 
Court, VOX (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.vox.com/2014/9/12/6138483/software-patents-are-
crumbling-thanks-to-the-supreme-court [http://perma.cc/68M3-A4W8]. 
 185. See Michel Brief, supra note 143, at 9; see also Ted Sichelman, Funk Forward, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE:  THE CONTESTED CONTOURS 368–69 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2014). 
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of other sections of the Patent Act.  This, they claim, has led to further 
uncertainty in the subject matter patentability analysis.186 
Historically, courts have noted that references to novelty or obviousness 
have no place in the § 101 analysis.187  In Flook, the Supreme Court was 
explicit in delineating how the proper construction of § 101 eligibility “does 
not involve the familiar issues of novelty and obviousness that routinely 
arise under §§ 102 and 103 when the validity of a patent is challenged.”188  
Likewise, in Diehr, the court stated “[t]he ‘novelty’ of any element or steps 
in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining 
whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of 
possibly patentable subject matter.”189  Citing both Diehr and Flook, Justice 
Stevens voiced similar concerns in his Bilski concurrence.190  Justice 
Stevens was critical of the Court’s reasoning, which appeared to bring 
novelty and other claim construction criteria into the subject matter 
patentability inquiry.191 
Likewise, the Federal Circuit has previously stated that analyzing § 101 
validity concerns prior to resolving any claim construction issues is not 
desirable.192  The court explained that “the determination of patent 
eligibility requires a full understanding of the basic character of the claimed 
subject matter.”193 
Without allowing for this understanding of the basic character of the 
claim, some practitioners view the Court’s analysis of abstract ideas in 
Alice as blurring and interjecting § 102 and § 103 requirements into the 
§ 101 analysis.194  Evidence of this blurring can been seen in opinions 
 
 186. See generally Where Do We Stand One Year After Alice, LAW360 (June 17, 2015, 
8:27 PM) [hereinafter Where Do We Stand], http://www.law360.com/articles/ 
668773/where-do-we-stand-one-year-after-alice [http://perma.cc/49Y4-GVJJ]. 
 187. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–90 (1981); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 
U.S. 593, 620–21 (2010). 
 188. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 (1978). 
 189. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 189–90 (citing cases stating that the questions of § 101 and 
those that involve novelty are separate inquiries). 
 190. See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 620–21 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 191. See id. (“[T]he fact that hedging is ‘long prevalent in our system of commerce[]’ . . . 
cannot justify the Court’s conclusion, as ‘the proper construction of § 101 . . . does not 
involve the familiar issu[e] of novelty that arise[s] under § 102.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 192. See Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1273–74 
(Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 193. See id. 
 194. See Belt, supra note 143; see also Kristen Osenga, Still Aiming at the Wrong Target:  
A Case for Business Method and Software Patents from a Business Perspective, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER, supra note 161, at 29, 40 (stating that 
“inquiries into novelty and nonobviousness have been hopelessly entwined into the § 101 
analysis”); David Bohrer, Guest Post:  In Rush to Invalidate Patents at Pleadings Stage, Are 
Courts Coloring Outside the Lines?, PATENTLYO (July 1, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/ 
2015/07/invalidate-pleadings-coloring.html [http://perma.cc/DLD2-RQNR]; John Duffy, 
Opinion Analysis:  The Uncertain Expansion of Judge-Made Exceptions to Patentability, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2014, 12:46 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/opinion-
analysis-the-uncertain-expansion-of-judge-made-exceptions-to-patentability/ [http:// 
perma.cc/PX6Y-4A8D]; David Hricik, Which Side of the Mushroom Did Alice Eat From?, 
PATENTLYO (June 22, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/hricik/2014/06/which-mushroom-
alice.html (describing the ambiguity of the Alice decision by stating “[it] is going to cause us 
2015] ABSTRACT IDEAS AFTER ALICE 841 
where language that has been used to invalidate patents is more reminiscent 
of the § 102 and § 103 requirements.195  For instance, courts have used 
descriptions such as “conventional,”196 “long prevalent,”197 “routine,”198 
and “well-known”199 to analyze § 101 claims—“improperly comingl[ing] 
patent-eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 with what is more appropriately an 
issue of patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 102 and/or 35 U.S.C. § 103.”200  
While this criticism arguably is not new,201 it has been exacerbated with the 
use of the Alice framework. 
This analysis is troubling to practitioners because it may allow courts to 
dispose of litigation without subjecting the claims to the clear and 
convincing evidence standard traditionally required under § 102 and 
§ 103.202  Unlike analysis under § 102 and § 103, subject matter 
 
all to bang our heads, stub our toes, and wander through Wonderland for many years to 
come”) [http://perma.cc/67PN-ZDW7]; Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Three Faces of Prometheus:  
Alice and Generic Application, PATENTLYO (June 24, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/ 
2014/06/prometheus-generic-application.html (“Alice may fail to provide clear boundaries 
for the eligibility of computer-implemented inventions.”) [http://perma.cc/JK54-X4JA]; Rob 
Merges, Symposium:  Go Ask Alice—What Can You Patent After Alice v. CLS Bank?, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-go-ask-
alice-what-can-you-patent-after-alice-v-cls-bank/ (referring to the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Alice:  “There is bound to be an enormous amount of argumentation over this framework 
in cases yet to come”) [http://perma.cc/4DSQ-A88P]; Michel, supra note 50, at 1753 
(describing how “you can’t look at § 101[] in isolation from § 102,[] § 103,[] and § 112,[] 
and have it work very well”). 
 195. See Belt, supra note 143. 
 196. See Loyalty Conversion Sys. Corp. v. Am. Airlines, LLC, 66 F. Supp. 3d 829, 843 
(E.D. Tex. 2014); CMG Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Pacific Tr. Bank, 50 F. Supp. 3d 1306, 1326 
(C.D. Cal. 2014); DietGoal Innovations LLC v. Bravo Media LLC, 33 F. Supp. 3d 271, 287–
88 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 197. See DietGoal Innovations LLC, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 283 (invalidating a patent because 
the practice was “long prevalent”). 
 198. See Loyalty Conversion Sys. Corp., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 838; Walker Dig., LLC v. 
Google, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d 501, 511, 515 (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2014); CMG Fin. Servs., Inc., 50 
F. Supp. 3d at 1326. 
 199. See I/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc., 976 Fed. App’x 982 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J., 
concurring) (describing that the patent should have been invalidated for containing ineligible 
subject matter by using the phrase “well-known”). 
 200. See Eric Guttag, The Broken Patent-Eligibility Test of Alice and Mayo:  Why We 
Urgently Need to Return to Principles of Diehr and Chakrabarty, IPWATCHDOG.COM (Sept. 
25, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/09/25/broken-patent-eligibility-test-of-alice-
and-mayo/id=51370/ [http://perma.cc/3PNF-FHQS]. 
 201. See Sachs, supra note 172 (noting criticisms of the consideration of novelty in the 
§ 101 analyses have been around since Flook); see also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 600 
(1978) (Stewart, J. dissenting) (describing how Flook “import[ed] into its inquiry under 35 
U.S.C. § 101 the criteria of novelty and inventiveness”). 
 202. See Belt, supra note 143; Bohrer, supra note 194; see also Osenga, supra note 194, 
at 30 (stating that “the PTO and the courts are using proxy-type inquiries to cut off the 
patentability analysis of these inventions at the threshold step”); Where Do We Stand, supra 
note 186 (describing Chuck Ebertin’s view that “[c]ourts are now invalidating patent after 
patent using their own subjective views as to what is sufficiently inventive to be patent 
eligible instead of applying the objective standards set forth in section 103”); Kong, supra 
note 147 (discussing the clear and convincing evidence required to determine that a claim is 
“conventional” under § 102 and § 103). 
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patentability analysis is subject to de novo review by the Federal Circuit 
because it is a question of law.203 
Consequently, whether they should or not, courts have already begun to 
dismiss patent claims at the motion to dismiss stage204 without citing any 
supportive language from the Patent Act.205  As David Stein, a patent 
practitioner, notes as of September 2014, “not one” court decision 
invalidating a patent under § 101 did so citing to any legislative history to 
support its interpretation; rather, courts relied on only other court 
opinions.206 
Because of this, “[t]he federal courts, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 
and the USPTO are using the very lack of a[n] [abstract ideas] definition to 
liberally expand the contours of abstract ideas to cover everything from 
computer animation to database architecture . . . .”207  Arguably, this liberal 
invalidation of claims for failing to contain patentable subject matter does 
not comport with the traditional interpretation of subject matter 
patentability.  Contrary to Judge Rader’s position, dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter eligibility is no longer an exception.208 
This early dismissal trend is troubling because the Supreme Court has not 
ruled that the “presumption of validity” no longer applies to § 101.209  
Although, historically, once a patent was issued by the USPTO it was 
presumed to be valid, scholars argue that “[t]he presumption of validity and 
the burden of clear and convincing evidence was nowhere to be seen” in 
recent decisions to invalidate patent claims at the motion to dismiss stage 
under § 101.210 
This tendency to invalidate patents could stifle innovation.  Some 
members of the judiciary argue that the Supreme Court’s approach to 
abstract ideas, and the Federal Circuit’s en banc plurality reasoning in Alice, 
could “decimate the electronics and software industries.”211  Judge Moore, 
 
 203. Osenga, supra note 194, at 41. 
 204. See, e.g., Tuxis Techs., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 13-1771-RGA, 2014 WL 
4382446 (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2014) (granting a motion to dismiss a patent dispute under Rule 
12(b)(6)); see also supra Part I.E. 
 205. David Stein, The Alice Trajectory, USPTO TALK (Sept. 27, 2014), 
http://www.usptotalk.com/the-alice-trajectory/ [http://perma.cc/Q3C2-SDJ8]. 
 206. See id. 
 207. Sachs, supra note 174. 
 208. See id. (describing how Judge Rader stated that “Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for lack of 
eligible subject matter will be the exception, not the rule”); Where Do We Stand, supra note 
186. 
 209. See Sachs, supra note 174; see also supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text. But 
see Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 717 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J., 
concurring) (describing how “no presumption of eligibility attends the section 101 inquiry”). 
 210. Belt, supra note 143; see also Sachs, supra note 172 (stating that the behavior of the 
courts “suggests that the presumption [of validity] in practice has no weight”).  Presumption 
of validity and clear and convincing evidence has traditionally been required when a court is 
analyzing the validity of a patent. See supra Part I.E. 
 211. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1313 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en 
banc) (Moore, J., dissenting) (“There has never been a case which could do more damage to 
the patent system than this one.”), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); see also Michel Brief, supra 
note 143, at 9. 
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in a dissent to the same plurality opinion, observed that “[i]f all of the 
claims of these [patents at hand] are ineligible, so too are the 320,799 
patents which were granted from 1998–2011 in the technology era.”212 
Similarly, former Chief Judge Michel argued that if the patents in Alice at 
issue were not analyzed similar to that in Diehr, the concept of relative 
abstractness will lead to confusion and would “cripple, if not destroy, 
computer-related industries, of which there are many and which are vital to 
the future of the country in today’s highly competitive global economy.”213  
Chief Judge Michel warned of the possible negative ramifications of 
defining the contours of patentable subject matter under § 101 too 
narrowly.214  He cautioned that adopting the Court’s prior test for life 
science § 101 cases would be “particularly unsuitable in computer cases 
because any software solution can be described at high levels that will 
necessarily be abstract, and lower levels that will not,” a way of 
examination that he stated “does not fit the realities of computer 
technology.”215  He feared analyzing software claims in this manner would 
lead to invalidity of the claims216—a hypothesis that thus far has 
occurred.217  Likewise, Chief Judge Michel claims that framework does not 
create adequate incentives to invest money in new inventions and 
innovations due to the uncertainty of subject matter patentability.218 
In applying the Alice test to the patentability of abstract ideas, critics 
argue that the Supreme Court seems to be making decisions about 
patentability utilizing “gut reactions or even worse, huge assumptions.”219  
 
 212. See Alice Corp., 717 F.3d at 1313 n.1 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 213. See Michel Brief, supra note 143, at 9.  Former Chief Judge Paul Redmond Michel 
served on the Federal Circuit from 1988 to 2010. See History of the Federal Judiciary:  
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, 1789–Present, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc. 
gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (search “Michel”) (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/ 
629W-WGVE]. 
 214. See Michel Brief, supra note 143, at 2 (“The criteria for patent-eligibility should 
exclude only clearly ineligible inventions, allowing the other sections of the Patent Act—
sections 102, 103, and 112 on conditions of patentability—to perform their respective 
functions.”); see also Michel, supra note 50, at 1753 (describing how recent court decisions 
lack broad perspectives regarding “the interaction of the different parts of the patent statute, 
the interaction between the PTO, the courts, the companies, the inventors, [and] the 
investors”). 
 215. See Michel Brief, supra note 143, at 8. 
 216. See id. at 11 (describing how if “the Court lets the [concept of abstractness] spread 
and its edges bleed and blur, neither computer innovation nor the public at large will 
benefit”). 
 217. See supra Part I.E. 
 218. See Michel, supra note 50, at 1760 (stating that the patent system is meant to induce 
investments because “not all invention but most invention [] requires a lot of money”). 
 219. See Michel, supra note 50, at 1753; see also Eclipse IP LLC v. McKinley Equip. 
Corp., No. SACV 14-154-GW (ajw), 2014 WL 4407592, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2014); 
Dennis Crouch, Abstract Idea:  I Know It When I See It, PATENTLYO (Sept. 11, 2014), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/09/abstract-know-when.html (describing Judge Wu’s 
dismissal of a patent for containing an abstract idea under the Alice framework) 
[http://perma.cc/3XES-RPR9]; Jason Rantanen, Alice, Artifice, and Action—and 
Ultramercial, PATENTLYO (July 8, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/07/artifice-action-
ultramercial.html (“[Section] 101 determinations are in the end based on nothing more than 
intuition.”) [http://perma.cc/M6UA-J8B9]; David Stein, Post-Alice Rationale for 35 USC 
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For example, Judge Wu of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of 
California likened the Supreme Court’s analysis in Alice to Justice 
Stewart’s famous test for analyzing obscenity220—explaining it as an 
unpredictable result that is problematic when patent applications must be 
examined by USPTO patent examiners.221  One proposed cause of these 
unpredictable results is that the Court has perpetuated unsubstantiated 
assumptions regarding § 101 by repeating them in its decisions without 
stating the data that it has relied upon in coming to its conclusions.222  An 
example that former Chief Judge Michel provides is Justice Breyer’s claim 
in Mayo that patents can stifle innovation, rather than incentivize it.223  
Chief Judge Michel views Justice Breyer’s proclamation “as an oracular 
truth” without data concerning that assessment.224  Likewise, in some 
instances, the judiciary has been bound by the “sweeping language” in the 
two-step framework, forcing them to invalidate patents where they “see no 
reason, in policy or statute why, [the invention] should be deemed patent 
ineligible.”225 
This use of sweeping language can cause further uncertainty in patent 
law that might affect innovation.  Because inventors are sometimes required 
to secure outside funding for their research, these inventors would favor 
broader patent protection as “patents induce investments.”226  For example, 
patents assist university research by enabling “successful 
commercialization” of innovation, decreasing the risk to investors by 
offering protection for the innovation, inducing investment as a result of 
that protection, and allowing the “innovation to be quantified.”227 
 
101 Ineligibility, USPTO TALK, http://www.usptotalk.com/post-alice-rationale-for-35-usc-
101-ineligibility/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) (describing courts’ reasoning for invalidating 
patents under § 101 after Alice as “subjective”) [http://perma.cc/F6X3-ETLH]. 
 220. See Eclipse IP LLC, 2014 WL 4407592, at *3.  In reference to obscenity, Justice 
Stewart stated:  “I know it when I see it.” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) 
(Stewart, J., concurring). 
 221. See Crouch, supra note 219. 
 222. See Michel, supra note 50, at 1754. 
 223. See id. 
 224. See id. at 1755 (stating the Court has “trapped [itself] by picking up dicta from 
ancient Supreme Court cases and repeating it and repeating it and turning it into . . . oracular 
truth”). 
 225. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(Linn, J., Concurring). 
 226. See, e.g., Driving American Innovation:  Creating Jobs and Boosting Our Economy:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 26 (2011) [hereinafter Driving American 
Innovation Hearing] (statement of Scott Smith, Professor & Chair, Department of 
Mechanical Engineering & Engineering Science, University of North Carolina at Charlotte); 
id. at 8 (statement of Anthony Atala, Director, Wake Forest Institute for Regenerative 
Medicine, W.H. Boyce Professor & Chair, Department of Urology, Wake Forest University 
School of Medicine) (describing the need for increased funding and “ensur[ed] intellectual 
property protection for everything [the Wake Forest Institute for Regenerative Medicine]” 
does). 
 227. See, e.g., id. at 26 (statement of Scott Smith, Professor & Chair, Department of 
Mechanical Engineering & Engineering Science, University of North Carolina at Charlotte).  
“[S]oftware patents represent a significant and growing percentage of university patent 
holdings.” Arti K. Rai, John R. Allison & Bhaven N. Sampat, University Software 
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As a remedy to the blurring and innovation consequences, some 
practitioners argue that Diehr should be codified by Congress in order to 
remove novelty and obviousness language from the § 101 analysis.228  
Likewise, judges have also advocated the use of § 102 and § 103 as a basis 
of finding invalidity to avoid using the uncertain criteria surrounding 
subject matter patentability and abstract ideas under Alice.229  Judge 
Gilstrap of the Eastern District of Texas has even issued new procedures for 
parties that wish to bring early motions to dismiss involving Alice.230  To 
curb dismissal of infringement claims prior to discovery, if a party wants to 
bring a motion to dismiss under Alice, Judge Gilstrap requires parties to 
show good cause before leave from the court can be granted.231 
B.  The Alice Framework Is a Threshold Inquiry 
In contrast to those that believe that the Alice framework blurs the 
procedural bounds of § 101, some members of the judiciary, practitioners, 
and scholars believe that the Supreme Court’s framework for analyzing 
abstract ideas under Alice is within the § 101 procedural bounds as a 
“threshold” inquiry.  In prior decisions, the Supreme Court and the Federal 
Circuit have recognized the subject matter patentability requirement of 
§ 101 as a “threshold test.”232  And, although the Supreme Court has not 
explicitly held that § 101 inquiries must be dealt with prior to analyzing 
claim construction elements, both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme 
Court have suggested that § 101 inquiries should be addressed first, prior to 
other invalidity issues.233 
Recently, Judge Mayer of the Federal Circuit has become one of the most 
vocal advocates of addressing § 101 invalidity issues prior to other 
 
Ownership and Litigation, in PERSPECTIVES ON PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER, supra note 
161, at 336, 340. 
 228. Sachs, supra note 172; see also Guttag, supra note 200 (urging Congress to curtail 
the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice by codifying Diehr and Chakrabarty). 
 229. MySpace v. Graphon Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1258–62 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  Practioners 
have also expounded this view to avoid the “ridiculous and legally incorrect . . . lumping [of 
all] the patentability requirements into a single 101 inquiry.” See Gene Quinn, Arbitrary and 
Capricious:  Exploring Judge Lourie’s Flip-Flop in Ultramercial, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 12, 
2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/02/12/arbitrary-capricious-judge-lourie-flip-flop-
in-ultramercial/id=52865/ [http://perma.cc/HA9H-BT6L]. 
 230. See, e.g., Christine M. Morgan & Jonah D. Mitchell, Judge Gilstrap Announces New 
Procedure for “Alice” Motions in Patent Cases, TECH. L. DISPATCH (June 5, 2015), 
http://www.technologylawdispatch.com/2015/06/intellectual-property/judge-gilstrap-
announces-new-procedure-for-alice-motions-in-patent-cases/?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_ 
medium=syndication&utm_campaign=View-Original [http://perma.cc/4QFP-UN4G].  Judge 
Gilstrap’s docket is one of the busiest patent dockets in the country. Id. 
 231. See id. 
 232. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010). 
 233. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) (describing how an analysis of 
§ 101 patentability “must precede determination of whether that discovery is, in fact, new or 
obvious”); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 973 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Only if the requirements of 
§ 101 are satisfied is the inventor allowed to pass through to the other requirements for 
patentability.”). 
846 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
analyses.234  In his concurrence in Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC,235 and 
his concurrence in I/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc.,236 Judge Mayer stated that 
subject matter patentability should be analyzed “at the very outset.”237  He 
believes that “a court has no warrant to consider subordinate validity issues 
such as non-obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 or adequate written 
description under 35 U.S.C. § 112” before it is determined that the claim at 
issue meets the § 101 threshold.238  Judge Mayer stated that the 
presumption of validity normally afforded to granted patents no longer 
applies in the § 101 analysis because the Supreme Court has not mentioned 
any presumption of eligibility while issuing its most recent § 101 
decisions.239  He also reasons that because the USPTO granted a majority 
of patents under different eligibility standards that are now outdated in light 
of Alice, they should not be given the presumption of validity.240 
Judge Mayer also offered an explanation for why any potential overlap 
between the § 101 subject matter patentability analysis, and the § 103 
obviousness inquiry, conforms to their proper procedural roles: 
Section 103 . . . asks the narrow question of whether particular claims are 
obvious in view of the prior art.  By contrast, the section 101 inquiry is 
broader and more essential:  it asks whether the claimed subject matter, 
stripped of any conventional elements, is “the kind of ‘discover[y]’” that 
the patent laws were intended to protect.241 
As such, due to the different function of § 101 as a threshold inquiry, 
disposing of unnecessary litigation could be achieved without having to 
wade through costly claim construction proceedings.242  Judge Mayer, and 
other scholars, have also posited that even if the lines between § 101 and 
the novelty and obvious sections of the Patent Act have become blurred, 
 
 234. I/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc., 576 Fed. App’x 982, 992 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J., 
concurring). 
 235. 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J., concurring). 
 236. 576 Fed. App’x 982 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J., concurring). 
 237. See id.; Ultramercial, Inc., 772 F.3d at 718 (Mayer, J., concurring) (describing how 
section § 101 invalidity issues must be decided prior to deciding subordinate validity issues 
like novelty, or obviousness). 
 238. See I/P Engine, Inc., 576 Fed. App’x at 995 (Mayer, J., concurring); see also 
Ultramercial, Inc., 772 F.3d at 718 (Mayer, J., concurring). 
 239. See Ultramercial, Inc., 772 F.3d at 720–21 (Mayer, J., concurring). 
 240. See Jeffri A. Kaminski, Concurrence in Federal Circuit’s “Ultramercial” Ruling 
Sends Pointed Message to Patent Litigants, THE WLF LEGAL PULSE (Nov. 19, 2014), 
http://wlflegalpulse.com/2014/11/19/concurrence-in-federal-circuits-ultramercial-ruling-
sends-pointed-message-to-patent-litigants/ [http://perma.cc/Y6JL-LRJJ]. 
 241. See I/P Engine, Inc., 576 Fed. App’x at 994 n.3 (Mayer, J., concurring) (quoting 
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)). 
 242. See id. at 992–1000 (Mayer, J., concurring); Kickstarter, Inc. v. Fan Funded, LLC, 
No. 1:11-cv-06909-KPF, 2015 WL 3947178, at *2 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2015) (describing 
how the dispute could have been disposed of in a motion for judgment on the pleadings); see 
also Scott W. Doyle et al., A Trend Toward Earlier Resolution of Patent Eligibility in the 
Post-Alice World?, BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.bna.com/trend-toward-
earlier-n17179895618/ (discussing recent court decisions dismissing patent claims for 
containing unpatentable subject matter in the pleadings stages prior to reviewing § 102, 
§ 103, or § 112 criteria) [http://perma.cc/J9HW-ADGL]. 
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this might be a good thing.243  He goes so far as to say the wide application 
of § 101 as a threshold inquiry can “cure systemic constitutional 
infirmities” by diminishing the prevalence of patents that hinder and stifle 
technological progress by invalidating them.244  Although Judge Mayer’s 
concurrence was nonbinding, courts in the District of Delaware and the 
Eastern District of Texas have followed suit.245 
This disposal of unworthy patent claims is beneficial because the patent 
system needs to be made more efficient.246  Currently, there are over 
550,000 patent applications waiting to be examined by the USPTO,247 and 
some scholars and practitioners believe that Alice allows courts, and the 
USPTO, to improve efficiency by disposing of cases involving patent 
trolls.248  Because “§ 101 determinations are made on the claim language 
alone,” dismissing claims under § 101 could save time and resources 
because it would prevent the need for “extensive research into the state of 
the art or the details of [the claim] documents.”249  This ability to dispose of 
frivolous claims under § 101 can help curb “unwarranted and inappropriate 
patent litigation” involving patent trolls.250 
According to Mark Lemley, a preeminent patent law scholar, these 
unwarranted lawsuits involving patent trolls have been curbed following 
Alice.251  Finding a way to dispose of abusive patents inexpensively, 
reliably, and early in the litigation process is a desirable goal.252  Since 
 
 243. See Ultramercial, Inc., 772 F.3d at 722 n.2 (Mayer, J., concurring) (citing Gerard N. 
Magliocca, Patenting the Curve Ball:  Business Methods & Industry Norms, 2009 BYU L. 
REV. 875, 900). 
 244. See id. at 722 n.2. 
 245. See Kaminski, supra note 240. 
 246. See Dyk, supra note 178, at 347–48 (describing the substantial backlog that faces 
patent applicants, patent examiners, and the Patent and Trademark Board of Appeals). 
 247. See Patent UPR Application Backlog, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/corda/ 
dashboards/patents/kpis/kpiBacklogDrilldown.kpixml (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) (depicting 
over 569,000 patent applications waiting to be examined as of June 2015) 
[http://perma.cc/UEQ5-3XWM]. 
 248. See Bohrer, supra note 194; Samuelson & Schultz, supra note 161, at 26; see also 
Ultramercial, Inc., 772 F.3d at 719.  The term “patent troll” is used to denote “entities that 
acquire patents for rent-seeking but that do not actually produce products covered by the 
patent.” Samuelson & Schultz, supra note 161, at 27. 
 249. Samuelson & Schultz, supra note 161, at 26. 
 250. Id. at 27.  Members of the judiciary also support this position.  For instance, Judge 
Mayer supports the use of Alice at the motion to dismiss stage to achieve efficiency goals. 
See, e.g., Bohrer, supra note 194. But see CLS Bank v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1284 
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (Lourie, J., concurring) (cautioning against the use of § 101 first as a basis 
for invalidity). 
 251. See James Bessen, What the Courts Did to Curb Patent Trolling—for Now, THE 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 1, 2014) (citing Mark Lemley), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/ 
archive/2014/12/what-the-courts-did-to-curb-patent-trollingfor-now/383138/ [http://perma. 
cc/3BKP-EF7C]. 
 252. See Michel, supra note 50, at 1761 (identifying the fact that the patent system needs 
to more efficiently process claims and dispose of litigation); see also Dyk, supra note 178, at 
352 (stating that “[l]imiting discovery is important, as is limiting the length of a trial” 
involving patent disputes). 
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Alice, courts have efficiently disposed of inappropriate litigation because 
the § 101 subject matter patentability question is a “threshold inquiry.”253 
Because of this, Alice “protects against patents that serve as barriers to 
scientific inquiry and progress.”254  Businesses have advocated that overly 
broad patents granted for business methods—an area that the Supreme 
Court has identified as being susceptible to containing abstract ideas255—
disrupts innovation because they lead to a rise in litigation costs and they 
divert resources that companies could use for research and development 
purposes.256  Robert Plotkin argues that this rise in overly broad patents can 
“stifle innovation” by causing a situation where companies cannot innovate 
without spending resources consulting with a large number of patent 
holders.257  Arguably, the Alice decision has led to a decrease in the 
resources companies waste trying to prevent infringement of overly broad 
patents because those businesses accused of infringing upon them are able 
to avoid discovery costs by having the claim dismissed at the motion to 
dismiss stage.258 
Scholars also argue that the types of patents that usually are analyzed 
under the Alice framework—business method patents—do not require 
patent incentives for innovation to take place.259  Samuelson and Schultz 
contend that business and service industries rely on tactics like “first mover 
advantage[], complementary assets, trade secrets, and consumer loyalty” 
 
 253. Kickstarter, Inc. v. Fan Funded, LLC, No. 1:11-cv-06909-KPF, 2015 WL 3947178, 
at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2015) (citing Fort Properties, Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 
F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 
 254. See Sandra Park, Symposium:  The Supreme Court As Promoter of Progress, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2014, 10:06 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/ 
symposium-the-supreme-court-as-promoter-of-progress/ [http://perma.cc/2BHX-Q4N8]. 
 255. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612–13 (2010) (invalidating a business 
method patent for containing a patent ineligible abstract idea). 
 256. See, e.g., Abusive Patent Litigation:  The Impact on American Innovation and Jobs, 
and Potential Solutions:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and 
the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 42, 46 (2013) (statement of John 
Boswell, Senior Vice President & General Counsel, SAS Institution Inc.) (describing 
“software and business method patents with fuzzy boundaries” as “weapons of mass 
destruction,” and describing how SAS spent over $8 million defending against a single 
patent infringement suit, and it “is money SAS no longer has to invest in people, facilities, 
research, or product development”); id. at 55 (statement of Philip S. Johnson, Chief 
Intellectual Property Counsel, Johnson & Johnson) (praising recent decisions of the Supreme 
Court and the Federal Circuit that enable “requirements to ensure that overly vague and 
ambiguous patents will not be upheld”); id. at 10–11 (statement of Mark Chandler, Senior 
Vice President & General Counsel, Cisco Systems) (describing how Cisco spends $50 
million dollars on patent litigation a year, and “in order to fund the litigation,” the company 
reduced the number of new patent filings that it makes in a year by 300 patents); id. at 36 
(statement of Janet L. Dhillon, Executive Vice President, General Counsel & Corporation 
Secretary, JCPenny Co., Inc.) (describing how J.C. Penny has to settle patent infringement 
suits concerning overly broad patents because “[i]n the retail business, our margins are 
already thin and the decision to settle or go to trial and spend millions of dollars litigating 
what we know is a junk patent has to be weighed against growing our business”). 
 257. See PLOTKIN, supra note 73, at 136.  Plotkin describes this situation of having to 
obtain permission from a large number of patent holders as a “patent thicket.” See id. 
 258. See, e.g., Bessen, supra note 251. 
 259. See Samuelson & Schultz, supra note 161, at 17. 
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instead of patent protection.260  Likewise, scholars argue that patents on 
business methods do not incentivize innovation because business method 
innovations are typically not as expensive as innovations in other research- 
and development-heavy industries.261  Consequently, “[w]ithout high up-
front costs to recoup, there is simply less need to protect business and 
service innovations with patents.”262 
The software industry has not traditionally lobbied for increased patent 
protection, and it is unique compared to other industries in this respect.263  
One reason put forth for this phenomenon is that the software industry’s 
rate of innovation is faster than the patent system is able to grant 
protection.264  Subsequently, the cost of obtaining a patent is simply not 
worth the benefit to software companies because the technology in the 
industry evolves so quickly.265  As a result, the reduced effectiveness of 
patent trolls, and the efficiency that the Alice framework provides, has 
produced a positive effect on patent law while conforming to the procedural 
framework of the Patent Act. 
III.  RESTORING § 101 TO A THRESHOLD INQUIRY AND NOTHING MORE 
Part III of this Note argues, ultimately, that the Alice framework injects 
uncertain and subjective analysis into the subject matter patentability 
review by blurring the § 101 requirements with the requirements of other 
sections of the Patent Act.  This Note contends that by importing language 
traditionally reserved for § 102, § 103, and § 112, Alice allows judges to 
review information subjectively that would normally be subject to 
objective, clear, and convincing evidence standards.  As a result, the Alice 
framework oversteps the bounds of § 101. 
Alice blurs the lines of § 101 for three reasons:  (1) it imports criteria into 
the § 101 analysis that is traditionally reserved for other sections of the 
patent act; (2) it creates unnecessary uncertainty by replacing the objective 
criteria utilized by § 102 and § 103 with subjective criteria; and (3) it allows 
 
 260. See id. at 18–19. 
 261. See id.; see also HAZEL V.J. MOIR, PATENT POLICY AND INNOVATION:  DO LEGAL 
RULES DELIVER EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC OUTCOMES? 66 (2013) (describing how techniques for 
data compression that allow fast data transmission should not be patentable because of the 
low research and development costs involved in their invention). 
 262. See Samuelson & Schultz, supra note 161, at 21. 
 263. See PLOTKIN, supra note 73, at 125 (stating that large companies in the software 
industry had testified “in opposition to software patents as recently as the 1990s,” and 
describing Microsoft, Oracle, and Autodesk’s testimony against software patents). 
 264. See id. (describing how software companies argued that innovation in the industry 
was proceeding at “blinding speed” absent software patents); see also Innovation in America 
(Part II):  The Role of Technology:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Courts, Intellectual 
Property, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 137, 161 (2013) 
[hereinafter Innovation in America Hearing] (statement of Nathan Seidle, President & Chief 
Executive Officer, Sparkfun Electric) (describing how “the creation of a patent and the 
enforcement of a patent are merely distractions to innovation”). 
 265. See, e.g., Innovation in America Hearing, supra note 264, at 161 (statement of 
Nathan Seidle, President & Chief Executive Officer, Sparkfun Electric) (stating, “The pace 
of the patent system makes obtaining a patent irrelevant in our technological company where 
the product is measured in weeks, not years”). 
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courts to exercise a policymaking function in place of congressional 
decision making. 
First, the Alice framework blurs the § 101 bounds because it ignores the 
plain meaning of the Patent Act, does not cite any legislative history 
supporting its position, and ignores prior precedent.  Unlike prior court 
decisions,266 the Alice framework does not look to the plain meaning of 
§ 101, and although the Supreme Court had stated that the plain meaning of 
§ 101 should be given “wide scope,” the Alice framework seems to have 
limited the patentability of inventions utilizing computers.267 
As lower court decisions have demonstrated, the language that has been 
used to invalidate patents under § 101 has been rife with adjectives like 
“conventional,” “well known,” and “routine,”268 importing issues of 
novelty and obviousness to the subject matter patentability analysis—a 
practice that traditionally has been held by the Supreme Court to have no 
relevance for § 101 questions.269  In Flook, Diehr, and Justice Stevens’s 
concurrence in Bilski, the subject matter patentability of the claim was 
described as a separate inquiry from novelty or nonobviousness.270  As a 
result, importing these criteria arguably does not comport with precedent. 
Although some view this overlap in language as permissive, like Judge 
Mayer,271 it has caused subjective determinations to be made regarding 
when a claim is “routine” or “conventional” instead of using the more 
objective criteria that § 102 and § 103 require to determine 
conventionality.272  Section 101 is a threshold inquiry,273 but the judicial 
exceptions to patentability should not be allowed to swallow patent law 
whole.  Courts have routinely exercised caution not to apply the judicial 
exceptions to patentability too broadly274 and not to foreclose patents 
involving computer technology.275  However, in implementing the Alice 
framework, this seems to have occurred.276 
Despite the distinction that Judge Mayer has made regarding § 101 and 
§ 103,277 determining what kinds of innovation the patent laws are designed 
to protect has traditionally utilized all sections of the Patent Act.278  As 
 
 266. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra Part I.E (discussing the invalidation of patents). 
 268. See supra Part II.A. 
 269. See supra notes 187–91 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra notes 187–91 and accompanying text. 
 271. See supra notes 240–42 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra notes 202–10 and accompanying text. 
 273. See supra notes 232–42 and accompanying text. 
 274. See supra note 131 (discussing decisions cautioning applying judicial exceptions too 
broadly). 
 275. See supra notes 100–02. 
 276. See supra Part I.E (discussing the large percentage of patents that have been 
invalidated involving computers under § 101 since Alice). 
 277. See supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text (describing that, to be patentable, a 
claim must contain patentable subject matter, be novel, be nonobvious, and be particularly 
described). 
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such, appropriating § 101 to perform the job of other sections is 
unwarranted. 
Unlike Judge Mayer’s suggestion, a plain text reading of 35 U.S.C. § 282 
would demonstrate that there is little ambiguity regarding whether a patent 
should be presumed valid,279 despite the contention that the previous 
methodology utilized by the USPTO undermines the presumption of 
validity.280 
Consequently, the blurring of the Patent Act criteria has created 
uncertainty.  Patent holders who expended time and resources to obtain 
patent protection to protect their innovations have seen the rug swept out 
from under them—having their patents dismissed at the pleading stage.281  
What constitutes “significantly more” in order for an application of an 
abstract idea to meet the Alice subject matter patentability requirement is in 
flux,282 and Alice has given little guidance to the lower courts or to patent 
examiners regarding when a claim contains patentable subject matter.  This 
had led to individualized—“I know it when I see it”283—analyses of when a 
computer innovation can receive patent protection,284 an ailment of patent 
law.285 
Despite the benefits that commentators have cited, such as the diminished 
effect of patent trolls and vexatious suits and improvement of patent 
efficiency,286 using the Alice framework in order to accomplish these policy 
goals is a role not normally performed by the judiciary.  Unlike in Benson, 
where the Court explicitly stated that it would hold off making policy 
determinations better suited for the legislature,287 lower courts have 
routinely cited policy reasons in invalidating patents for subject matter 
patentability since Alice.288  Often, courts have not cited any concrete 
statutory reasoning for invalidating the claims at issue, but instead cited 
policy reasons, such as to “promote innovation.”289 
As a remedy, this Note contends that a significant increase in speed or 
efficiency added by an invention should constitute “significantly more” to 
satisfy the second prong of Alice.  Allowing speed or efficiency to 
constitute “significantly more” will be beneficial for four reasons:  (1) it 
will allow § 101 to conform to its traditional role as a “coarse filter”; (2) it 
will allow for greater certainty and stability in the subject matter 
patentability analysis; (3) it will allow for increased innovation; and (4) it 
will diminish the Supreme Court’s role as a policymaker. 
 
 279. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”). 
 280. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra Part I.E. 
 282. See supra Part I.D (describing the difficulty of determining what “significantly 
more” entails). 
 283. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 284. See supra notes 219–21 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 286. See supra Part II.B. 
 287. See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text. 
 288. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
 289. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
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Allowing speed or efficiency to play a part in the abstract idea analysis 
would conform to the “coarse filter” statutory interpretation of § 101 that 
the Supreme Court has adopted in its precedents.290  By interpreting § 101 
as a coarse filter, courts have recognized that even if a patent contains 
patentable subject matter under § 101, it still can be invalidated under other 
provisions in the Patent Act291—prohibiting the need for § 101 to act as the 
ultimate defense for invalidating undesirable patents. 
The application of the current Supreme Court standard for analyzing the 
patentability of abstract ideas has caused the Federal Circuit and district 
courts to invalidate patent claims in the majority of implementations of the 
Alice framework to date.292  These recent lower court holdings demonstrate 
an upset in the balance between the broad scope traditionally given to 
patentable subject matter under § 101 and protecting the basic building 
blocks of innovation through the judicial exceptions to patentability. 
Although an argument can be made that the inclusion of speed or 
efficiency in the analysis could possibly hinder new discoveries by 
prohibiting the use of some abstract ideas and laws of nature in the future if 
the patent claiming the judicial exception is not narrowly tailored and broad 
in scope,293 it must still be balanced by the propensity of the judicial 
exception to swallow patent law whole.294  Because “all inventions at some 
level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, or abstract ideas,”295 allowing a substantial increase in speed or 
efficiency to constitute “substantially more” can possibly restore the 
balance between the text of § 101 and the judicial exceptions as it would 
allow § 101 to work as a “coarse filter.” 
In addition to restoring the balance between the patentable subject matter 
and the judicial exceptions to § 101, allowing speed or efficiency to play a 
part in the abstract idea analysis can contribute to the uniformity and 
consistency of patent law that judges have been aspiring to create for 
businesses and inventors.296  By allowing speed or efficiency to play a role, 
courts would have a bright-line test to evaluate patent claims instead of 
relying on ambiguous notions of “abstraction.”  Because speed and 
efficiency can be measured,297 they are likely better indicators of 
patentability than the unquantifiable notion of abstract ideas that the 
judiciary and the courts have viewed as ineffective to the patent analysis.298 
 
 290. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 292. See supra Part I.E. 
 293. See supra Part I.D. 
 294. See supra note 131. 
 295. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012); 
see also supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 297. See Speed, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) 
(describing speed as a “rate of motion”).  “Efficiency” is defined as “effective operations as 
measured by a comparison of production with cost as in energy, time, and money.” Id. 
Efficiency. 
 298. See supra notes 78–88 and accompanying text (discussing the ambiguity involved in 
defining abstract ideas). 
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Although relying on the judiciary and patent examiners to determine 
when there is a significant improvement in speed or efficiency may be hard 
to measure if the patented advance is a process or method that takes varying 
degrees of time during the course of ordinary business, including an 
increase in speed or efficiency in the analysis could be beneficial.  An 
increase in speed or efficiency could provide a more concrete basis upon 
which the courts and the USPTO could start the § 101 analysis rather than 
simply determining if an invention contains an abstract idea, which has 
been difficult to define.299 
Similar to creating stability, allowing speed or efficiency to play a part in 
the abstract idea analysis could give inventors incentive to discover new 
technologies, for example evolving technologies such as the self-creating 
inventions described by Robert Plotkin.300  The inclusion of speed or 
efficiency would protect the value that is prized in modern invention, 
particularly that which utilizes algorithms and computer programming in 
the information age. 
Although the software industry has not traditionally been a zealous 
advocate for patent protection because its members claim allowing patent 
protection in a rapidly changing industry might prohibit growth,301 large 
software companies have recently begun applying for patent protection on 
their inventions.302  Without allowing a significant increase in speed or 
efficiency to play a role in the patentability analysis, it seems that these 
patents from software companies will fail to meet the Alice test and will 
nullify the companies’ investments. 
In addition, a patent’s ability to be upheld by including a substantial 
increase in speed or efficiency in the analysis could spur innovation in 
inventors who require investment backing for their research.303  As stated 
above, “patents induce investments,” and the ability of researches to 
decrease risks to their investors by incentivizing them with patent 
protection could assist university research.304 
Lastly, the inclusion of an increase in speed or efficiency in the 
“significantly more” analysis could reduce the role of the Supreme Court as 
a policymaker.  Having a bright-line indicator of whether an invention adds 
“significantly more” to the underlying abstract idea will prevent courts from 
weighing whether an invention ties up natural laws and inhibits future 
discoveries305—a policy inquiry for which the courts are not well suited.  
As described by former Chief Judge Michel, the Supreme Court has made 
claims concerning the ability of patents to stifle innovation without citing 
any data to substantiate its claim.306  This is dangerous because it allows 
 
 299. See supra notes 79–80. 
 300. See PLOTKIN, supra note 73. 
 301. See supra notes 264–65 and accompanying text. 
 302. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. 
REV. 1, 49 (2008) (describing how “the major search engines have patent portfolios”). 
 303. See supra notes 226–27 and accompanying text. 
 304. See supra notes 226–27 and accompanying text. 
 305. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 306. See supra notes 223–24 and accompanying text. 
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courts to invalidate patents on potentially false information.  Analyzing 
speed and efficiency will provide the court with data concerning an 
invention’s usefulness instead of relying on an “I know it when I see it”307 
analysis. 
For these reasons, a substantial increase in speed or efficiency added by 
an invention should be taken into account for determining patentability 
under § 101. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, the importance of patent 
protection for inventors has “scarcely [been] questioned,”308 and the text of 
the Intellectual Property Clause has been interpreted to allow “anything 
under the sun that is made by man”309 to be patentable subject matter.  
Allowing a significant increase in speed or efficiency added by an invention 
or discovery to be taken into account for the purposes of determining 
whether the invention falls into the judicial exception for abstract ideas will 
restore the balance between the broad language of the statutory text and the 
judicial exceptions to patentability that Alice has upset and blurred. 
Using speed and efficiency to restore this balance will allow § 101 to act 
as a “coarse filter,”310 while still providing “liberal encouragement”311 for 
innovation by prohibiting inventions or discoveries that fail to meet the 
other requirements contained in Title 35 from receiving patent protection. 
 
 307. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Steven, J., concurring); see also supra 
notes 219–21 and accompanying text. 
 308. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 19, at 307 (James Madison). 
 309. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 310. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
